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Abstract. Nowadays, most research is focused on post-quantum cryptography. But the ap-
plication of the results obtained will not be effective today. This is why it is always important
to improve the existing cryptosystems whose security is based on the current difficult prob-
lems. Hence the interest of elliptic cryptography where security is based on the discrete
logarithm. In 2011, a modified version of the ElGamal scheme was proposed for a cyclic
group Z/pZ where p is a prime number. In this paper, we propose an IND-CPA version of
ElGamal’s modified elliptic curves scheme. We then propose an IND-CCA version of KEM
based on the random oracle model.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography, although important, is not yet used in the professional environment.
Most of the proposed schemas are not implemented in today’s security devices. NIST has opened
a competition for the selection of better cryptosystems in some areas such as key exchange,
encryption and data signing. The second phase of testing has just been completed but the
chosen schemes are not yet standardized for use in business. These reasons make it necessary
to improve the security of current schemes or even to propose new schemes.
Cryptography based on elliptic curves still resists to several known attacks if one works
with large prime number p which is not a prime number power.
The elliptic curve cryptography introduced by Koblizt in [17] is a widely area in that it
not only increases the efficiency of large number computations but also increases the security
of protocols based on elliptic curves.
In 1985, Taher ElGamal [11] presented an encryption and signature scheme called ElGa-
mal scheme. The security of the ElGamal encryption is equivalent to the Decision Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption. Note that obtaining the full plaintext of an ElGamal encrypted ciphertext
is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman assumption [20].
In the same year (1985), Koblit [16] and Miller have proposed the implementation of
public key cryptosystem using elliptic curve group over finite field. The elliptic curve group
forms a finite cyclic group so that the elliptic curve group over finite field can be used to
implement ElGamal public key cryptosystem.
In 1998, Sutikno and al. designed the ElGamal scheme into elliptic curves in their paper
titled ”An Implementation of ElGamal Elliptic Curves Cryptosystems” [22].
In 2014, Debabrat Boruah and al. proposed an Implementation of ElGamal Elliptic
Curve Cryptography over prime field using C in [6].
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In 2013, Bernstein and al. proposed a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on
ElGamal encryption scheme into elliptic curves [18]. In the same paper, they proposed a deter-
ministic encoding called Elligator.
In 2016, Marc Joye designed the IND-CCA2 of ElGamal encryptuon scheme in the
standard model [14].
In 2017, Nafissatou Diarra and al. proposed a new deterministic encodings based on
Elligator’s model, for some families of elliptic curves [8]. Note also that the deterministic en-
coding in elliptic curves makes it possible to transform a string of characters into a point of an
elliptic curve.
In [21], a modified variant of the ElGamal scheme has presented and it called Generalized
ElGamal scheme. As ElGamal’s scheme, the Generalized ElGamal scheme is based on Decisional
Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH) (see Boneh [5] and Joux and al. [13]).
The key generation algorithm of Generalized ElGamal scheme is less faster than those
of ElGamal scheme because it uses two exponents in the public key generation. This is not a
problem because key generation is done once.
In the Generalized ElGamal scheme, the key decryption size is smaller than those of
ElGamal scheme; reason why the Generalized ElGamal scheme is more performant that the
ElGamal scheme since the decryption process is fast (note that the computing time of a modular
power using a small exponent is shorter than that using a large exponent). But the encryption
mechanism has the same efficiency than ElGamal encryption mechanism.
In this paper, we propose a IND-CPA Generalized ElGamal scheme over the elliptic
curves. Then, we present a IND-CCA2 key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on the
Generalized ElGamal’s scheme over the elliptic curves.
This paper is organized as follow:
• In section 1: we design an IND-CPA Generalized ElGamal scheme over elliptic curves.
• In section 2: we propose an IND-CCA2 key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on
the Generalized ElGamal scheme over elliptic curves.
1. IND-CPA of Generalized ElGamal’s scheme over elliptic curves
In [21], Demba SOW and Djiby SOW presented a variant of Modified ElGamal encryption in
a group G. Here, we propose this same version in elliptic curves.
1.1. Key generation algorithm
To create a public/private key, Bob should do the following.
1. Select an elliptic curve E/Fq over a finite field Fq and P ∈ E(Fq) a generator element of
order d. Let P∞ the point at infinity.
2. Select two random integers 2 < k < s < d sufficiently large, (s and k are coprime with
n = #E(Fq) and computes kd;
3. Compute with euclidian division algorithm, the pair (r, t) such that kd = rs + t where
t = kd mod s and r =
⌊
kd
s
⌋
< d ;
4. Compute γ = s · P and δ = t · P in E(Fq);
5. Bob’s public key is ((γ, δ), E(Fq), n = #E(Fq)) and Bob’s private key is ((r, s, t), E(Fq), n =
#E(Fq));
Remark 1.1. Note that only r is used in decryption process. But (r, s, t) are used in signature
mechanism.
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1.2. Encryption algorithm
To encrypt a message for Bob, Alice should do the following.
1. Obtain ((γ, δ), E(Fq), n = #E(Fq)), the Bob’s public key;
2. Select a random integer 2 < α < n = #E(Fq) such that α and n = #E(Fq) are coprime;
computes c1 = α · γ and λ = α · δ in E(Fq) (hence c1 6= P∞ and λ 6= P∞);
3. Transform the message m as an element of E(Fq) and computes c2 = λ+m in E(Fq);
4. The ciphertext is (c1, c2) in E(Fq)
1.3. Decryption algorithm
To decrypt a message encrypted with his public key, Bob should do the following.
1. Obtain (r, E(Fq)), the Bob’s private key ( first part of the private key) and (c1, c2) the
ciphertext;
2. Compute r · c1 + c2 in E(Fq);
3. The plaintext is m = r · c1 + c2.
1.4. Correctness of Decryption
Bob computes r·c1+c2 = rα·γ+λ+m = rα·γ+α·δ+m = α(r·γ+δ)+m = α(rs·P+t·P )+m =
α(rs+ t)P +m = αkdP +m = αk · P∞ +m = m
1.5. The IND-CPA secure of Generalized ElGamal’s scheme over Elliptic curves
The following theorem shows the IND-CPA secure of the Generalized ElGamal encryption over
Elliptic curves.
Theorem 1.2. The Generalized ElGamal encryption scheme over Elliptic curves is indistinguish-
able under chosen-plaintext attacks, i.e. it is IND-CPA secure under the DDH Assumption.
Proof. Let a random instance (α = a · g, β = b · g) of the DDH problem that one wants
to solve, considering the attacker A = (A1,A2) against the Generalized ElGamal encryption in
time t. We write Game−0 the attacker’s scenarios, we modify it gradually to solve DDH. We
note C the challenger.
Game 0: A = (A1,A2)
1: k, s
Rand←− G = Fq, compute (r, t) such that kd = rs+ t, d = o(g), g a generator in E(Fq): C
2: (m1,m2)←− AD1 (γ, δ)
3: (m˜1, m˜2)←− E(γ,mσ, kσ), σ Rand←− {0, 1} : C
4: {0, 1} 3 σ′ ←− AD2 (m˜1, m˜2)
5: Note Pr(σ = σ′) = Pr(S0) = ε′
Game 1: A = (A1,A2)
1: We modify (γ, m˜1) in (α, β), m˜2 is unchanged so (r = a, δ = β).
2: The distributions of r, γ are identical because (α, β, a) are random.
3: We denote S1 the associated random event and then Pr(S1) = Pr(S0).
Game 2: A = (A1,A2)
1: We modify m˜2 in the previous case instead of m˜2 = m+ λ+ k · γ
2: We put m˜2 = mσC where C = DH(α, β).
3: If S2 is the associated random event then Pr(S2) = Pr(S1).
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Game 3: A = (A1,A2)
1: Here we replace C = DH(α, β) by C = c · g, c a random
2: Note S3 the associated event
3: Now, since σ′ = σ is a detectable event, we can define a distinguishing algorithm that:
• executes the game Game−2 if C = DH(α, β)
• executes the game Game−2 if C 6= DH(α, β)
and that
• returns 1 if σ′ = σ
• returns 0 if σ′ 6= σ
4: But, we have:
Pr[1←− D/C Rand←− ] = Pr[S2]
Pr[1←− D/C = DH(α, β)] = Pr[S3]
5: But considering that DH(α, β) and C for Game−3 are both perfectly random, we see that
Pr[S3] = 1/2
6: By putting ε′ = ε, we have AdvDDH(t) = Pr[S2] − Pr[S3] = 1+ε2 − 12 = ε, hence ε =
2AdvDDH(t) whence the desired advantage.

Example 1.3. Generalized ElGamal Encryption over elliptic curve in SageMath.
sage : p = nextprime(ZZ.random−element(2 ∗ ∗(256))); p
32484443664970933158402312624437270983741826314720350161114526973070665131307
sage : Fp = FiniteField(p); Fp
Finite Field of size 32484443664970933158402312624437270983741826314720350161114526973070665131307
sage : a = Fp(ZZ.random−element(2 ∗ ∗(80))); a
970085316367588651321488
sage : b = Fp(ZZ.random−element(2 ∗ ∗(80))); b
877255284764872541942131
sage : E = EllipticCurve(Fp, [a,b]); E
Elliptic Curve defined by y2 = x3 + 970085316367588651321488 ∗ x + 877255284764872541942131
over Finite Field of size 32484443664970933158402312624437270983741826314720350161114526973070665131307
sage : G = E.gens()[0]; G
(363666655311873169763815770874902212275556400544879189699498609031202164166 :
7415313908025779464777118232922108240613840145732220554619905081854476928941 : 1)
sage : d = G.order(); d
32484443664970933158402312624437270983910419976549998870886451071576717960880
sage : k = randrange(r); k
2452180592332502772524631476654395967092599721972109828410150175605024599591L
sage : kd = k ∗ d; kd
79657722307960240117686448968407383954619539032182361922034337121090052800054317
564574055758862846227704755425822726888821273093028291819319360002000080
sage : s = randrange(d); s
1915309534412654404151621444416582481294036792450809949973506363147417950598L
sage : r = kd//s; r
41589999358713547610654869739897659503554638261267746216466957195799712788323
sage : t = kd % s; t
536148300113998375136738022806643043117934737149084506596547138771156732926
sage : gamma = s ∗G; gamma
(29411102504721884839471655051222934584742242674477765246918090603903944714015 :
5152391621750586690140381111924028277350013614924222775307244555472264548891 : 1)
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sage : delta = t ∗G; delta
(10986779217934681908321107246352604490422252490083515031190155212918196916094 :
27094652424292537200363379283815356321021979615358038265128483944432540005981 : 1)
sage : alpha = randrange(d); alpha
654032566049351468255620723047237220998876483425288703672460971626252293118L
sage : m = E.random−element(); m
(5105531099686504073901440904992482254334181121035940970980349840915547916525 :
11187028371724770513215365020139673930493736245586143071058800390114356732117 : 1)
sage : c1 = alpha ∗ gamma; c1
(22214415222217140546387756848703890949471390892344675038153267745917466809748 :
23593881427858069089265034092284526114348215246440907166491980920394228517416 : 1)
sage : c2 = alpha ∗ delta + m; c2
(30221779283651331816256209101365679410441028065002772512106994700822468548833 :
23432674372747710021683787433320220044003261321985488861370141101534597447501 : 1)
sage : r ∗ c1 + c2 == m
True
2. The IND-CCA2 secure KEM based on the Generalized ElGamal’s scheme
2.1. Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)
The model for KEM schemes is summarized as follows:
Definition 2.1. A KEM scheme consists of the following triple of polynomial-time algorithms
(Ge,En,De):
• Ge(1k) −→ (ek, sk) : (a key-generation algorithm) takes on input 1k, where k is the security
parameter, and outputs a pair of keys (ek, sk). ek and sk are called the encapsulation key
and decapsulation key, respectively.
• En(ek) −→ (c,K): (an encapsulation algorithm) takes as input an encapsulation key ek
and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C and a key K ∈ K.
• De(sk, c) ∈ K/ ⊥: (a decapsulation algorithm) takes as input a decapsulation key sk and
a ciphertext c and outputs a key K or a rejection symbol ⊥/∈ K.
Definition 2.2. ( Correctness). A KEM = (Ge,En,De) has perfect correctness if for any (ek, sk)
generated by Ge, we have:
Pr[De(sk, c) = K : (c,K)←− En(ek)] = 1.
Security of KEM: We define indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks de-
noted by IND-CCA for KEM.
Definition 2.3. For any adversary A, we define its IND-CCA advantages against a KEM’s
scheme (KEM = (Ge,En,De)) as follows:
Advind−ccaKEM,A(K) :=
∣∣∣Pr[Exptind−ccaKEM,A(K) = 1]− 1/2∣∣∣ ,
where Exptind−ccaKEM,A(K) is the experiment described in Figure 1.
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Exptind−ccaKEM,A(K):
b←− {0, 1}
(ek, dk)←− Ge(1k)
(c∗,K∗0 )←− En(ek)
K∗1 ←− K
b′ ←− ADECc∗ (·)(ek, c∗,K∗b )
Return (b′ ?= b)
DECc∗(c):
if c = c∗, return ⊥
K := De(sk, c)
return K
Figure 1. Games for KEM schemes
2.2. The Generalized ElGamal’s KEM
Let E/Fq be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fq, P ∈ E(Fq) a generator element of order q
and P∞ the point at infinity.
We denote:
− H a hash function;
− Ek(m) a symmetric encryption of a message m using a secret key k;
− Dk(c) a symmetric decryption of a cipher text c using a secret key k;
− S a set of strings: S ⊆ {0, 1}b. We require #S to be very close to 2b, so that a uniform
random element of S is indistinguishable from a uniform random b-bit string;
− pi : S −→ E(Fq) an injective map which transforms a bit string as an element of E(Fq).
Let [γ, δ, E(Fq), n = #Fq] be Bob’s public key and [r, E(Fq)] be Bob’s private key as
above. Suppose that Bob has published the parameter θB = pi
−1(rγ). Alice wants to send a
message m to Bob.
• Encryption: To encrypt the message m, she performs the following steps:
1. She generates a random integer ρ ∈ Fq.
2. She computes R = ρ · γ ∈ E(Fq)
3. She computes θR = pi
−1(R) ∈ S.
4. She computes λ = pi(θB) ∈ E(Fq).
5. She computes the shared key value k = H(ρλ).
6. She encrypts message m using the key k : c = Ek(m).
7. She sends the couple (θR, c) as an encryption of m.
• Decryption: To decrypt the received message c, Bob performs the following steps:
1. He computes pi(θR) = R ∈ E(Fq),
2. He computes the same shared key value: k = H(rR), and
3. He decrypts the message: m = Dk(c).
• Correctness: Bob computes H(rR) = H(rρ · γ) = H(ρ · rγ) = H(ρpi(θB)) = H(ρλ) = k.
He decrypts the ciphertext c with this key k and the symmetric decryption Dk().
2.3. Provable Security
In this section, we present the Gap Hashed Diffie-Hellman assumption (GHDH) over Elliptic
curves and we propose a theorem which proves the security of the KEM based on the Generalized
ElGamal’s scheme over elliptic curves.
2.3.1. The Gap Hashed Diffie-Hellman assumption (GHDH) over Elliptic Curves. Let E/Fq
be an elliptic curve over the finite field Fq, Gen be a polynomial-time algorithm that takes
input 1k and returns the description of a additive cyclic group E(Fq) of prime order q, where
2k < q < 2k+1, and a random element generator P of E(Fq). Gen furthermore outputs the
description of a random hash function H : E(Fq) −→ {0, 1}`(k) that outputs `(k) bits for a
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fixed polynomial `(·). Let Ω = (E , P, q,H) be a shorthand for the description of the hash group
obtained by running Gen.
The GHDH assumption relative to Gen states that the two distributions (a·P, b·P,H(ab·
P )) and (a · P, b · P,Γ) are computationally indistinguishable when a, b are drawn at random
from Fq and Γ is drawn at random from {0, 1}`(k). This assumption should hold relative to an
oracle that efficiently solves the DDH problem. More formally, to an adversary A we associate
the following experiment.
Experiment ExpghdhGen , H,A(1k)
Gen(1k); x, y $←− Fq; W0 $←− {0, 1}`(k); W1 $←− H(ab · P )
δ
$←− {0, 1}; δ′ $←− ADDHsolve(·,·,·,·)(1k,Ω, a · P, b · P,Wδ)
If δ 6= δ′ then return 0 else return 1.
Here the oracle DDHsolve(P, x · P, y · P, z · P ) returns 1 if and only if xy = z mod q.
We define the advantage of A in the above experiment as
AdvghdhGen,A(k) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpghdhGen , H,A(1k) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
We say that the Gap Hashed Diffie-Hellman (GHDH) assumption relative to group generator
Gen holds if AdvghdhGen,A(k) is a negligible function in k for all polynomial-time adversaries A.
Remark 2.4. Remark that in so called gap-groups, i.e. in groups where the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) problem is easy on every input while the computational Diffie-Hellman problem
(CDH) is hard [19], the GHDH assumption is equivalent to the HDH assumption [1]. A possible
implementation of gap-groups is given by the Weil/Tate bilinear pairing allowing to efficiently
compute a bilinear pairing which can be used to solve DDH [4].
2.3.2. Security of the Generalized ElGamal’s KEM. In this subsection, we give the theorem
which proves the security of the KEM based on the Generalized ElGamal’s scheme over elliptic
curves.
Theorem 2.5. Under the Gap Hashed Diffie-Hellman assumption relative to generator Gen, the
Generalized ElGamal’s key encapsulation mechanism from Section 2.2 is secure against adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2).
Remark 2.6. The above theorem means that for any adversary A against the KEM running
for time τA(k), there exist an adversary B with AdvghdhGen,B(k) ≥ Advkem−ccaKEM,A (k) and τB(k) =
τA(k)+O(qA ·τE(k)), where qA is an upper bound on the number of decapsulation queries made
by adversary A and τE(k) is the time for a standard operation in E.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an instance of IND-CCA2 game and execute the algo-
rithm A to solve the Gap Hashed Diffie-Hellman problem. Let a triple of points (γ, δ,H(ρλ) =
H(ρrγ)) = (sG, tG,H(ρrsG)) on the elliptic curve E where G is a generator of E(Fq), and that
one wants to compute H(ρrsG).
Let A a polynomial time adversary that breaks the chosen ciphertext security of the
Generalized ElGamal’s key encapsulation mechanism with (non-negligible) advantageAdvkem−ccaKEM,A (k)
and makes at most qA decapsulation queries.
In order to prove the theorem, one can show that there exists an adversary B that runs
in time τB(k) = τA(k) + O(qA · τE(k)), (where τE(k) is the time to perform a basic operation
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in E) and runs adversary A as a subroutine to solve a random instance of the GHDH problem
with advantage AdvghdhGen,B(k) ≥ Advkem−ccaKEM,A (k).
To start the simulation of the IND-CCA2 game, firstly, we give the description of
adversary B.
Adversary B inputs the values (Ge(1k), γ = sG, δ = tG,Ω = H(ρrγ)) as an instance of
the GHDH problem. To break the GHDH problem, B must calculate Ω and verify if Ω = H(ρrγ)
or Ω ∈ {0, 1}l is a random bit string. Adversary B runs adversary A simulating its view as in
the original KEM security experiment.
By the proof of theorem 1 in [15], the Generalized ElGamal’s key encapsulation mech-
anism from Section 2.2 is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks.

Conclusion
We have successfully designed the IND-CPA secure of the Generalized ElGamal scheme into
elliptic curves and at the same time presented a IND-CCA2 secure key encapsulation mechanism
(KEM) based on the Generalized ElGamal’s scheme over elliptic curve.
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Appendix A. Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the Public Key Encryption (PKE) notions, the elliptic curves over a
field, the deterministic encoding and randomness extractor in elliptic curves.
A.1. Public Key Encryption Scheme
Definition A.1. A public key encryption scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithms Γ = (G,E,D) such that:
1. The key generation algorithm G takes as input the security parameter and outputs a pair
of public and secret keys (pk, sk).
2. The encryption algorithm E takes as input a public key pk and a message m from some
underlying plaintext message space. It outputs a ciphertext c, i.e, c = Epk(m).
3. The decryption algorithm D takes as input (sk, c) and outputs a message m or ⊥. We
denote it by m = Dsk(c).
We note that E may be probabilistic but D must be deterministic and it is required for
any encryption scheme to be valid, Dsk(Epk(m)) = m is satisfied.
A.2. Elliptic curves over a field F
Definition A.2. Let F be a field.
• An elliptic curve E over F can be given by the so-called Weierstrass equation
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6
where the coefficients a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ F and E has to be nonsingular.
• The set of F-rational points on E is defined by the set of points
E(F) = {(x, y) ∈ F× F : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6} ∪ {P∞}
where P∞ is the point at infinity.
• The set of F-rational points on E by means of the chord-and-tangent process turns E(F)
into an abelian group with P∞ as the neutral element.
Definition A.3. ( Elliptic curves over a finite field Fq).
Let Fq be a field not of characteristic 2 or 3. Suppose a, b ∈ Fq such that x3 + ax + b has
no multiple roots. The equation of the elliptic curve E can be transformed into the reduced
Weierstrass form
y2 = x3 + ax+ b, a, b ∈ Fq
where 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. When Fq for some prime q > 3, such a curve will be denoted Eq(a, b).
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Theorem A.4. ( Hasse). Let E be an elliptic curve over Fq. Then
q + 1− 2√p ≤ |E| ≤ q + 1 + 2√q.
Definition A.5. ( Some Forms of Elliptic Curves).
There are many ways to represent an elliptic curve such as: Long Weierstrass: y2+a1xy+a3y =
x3 + a2x
2 + a4x + a6, Short Weierstrass: y
2 = x3 + ax + b, Legendre: y2 = x(x − 1)(x − λ),
Montgomery: by2 = x3 +ax2 +x, Doche-Icart-Kohel: y2 = x3 + 3a(x+ 1)2, Jacobi intersection:
x2 + y2 = 1, /ax2 + z2 = 1, Jacobi quartic: y2 = x4 + 2ax2 + 1, Hessian: x3 + y3 + 1 = 3dxy,
Edwards [10]: x2 + y2 = c2(1 + x2y2), Twisted Edwards [3]: ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2; Huff [12]:
ax(y2 − 1) = by(x2 − 1).
Some of these define curves with singular projective closures but geometric genus 1.
Definition A.6. (Discrete Logarithm Problem over elliptic curves) Let E/Fq be an elliptic curve
over a finite field Fq and P ∈ E(Fq) a generator element of order q.
• The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is to determine the integer k,
given rational points P and Q on E(Fq), and given that kP = Q.
• The Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (ECCDH) is the following:
given rational points Q1 = k1P and Q2 = k2P , compute Q = k1k2P .
• The Elliptic Curve Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDDH) is the problem of distin-
guishing
(P, k1P, k2P, k1k2P ) from (P, k1P, k2P, kP ), where k1, k2, k ∈ Fq.
• The Gap Diffie-Hellman problem (Gap-ECDH) is the problem of finding k1k2P when given
(P, k1P, k2P ) and an oracle O that correctly solves the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem,
where k1, k2, k ∈ Fq.
• The Oracle Diffie-Hellman problem (ODH) is the problem of distinguishing (P, k1P, k2P,H(k1k2P ))
from (P, k1P, k2P,K), where H : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}hlen is a suitable hash function, k1, k2, k ∈
Fq, K ∈ {0, 1}hlen , and an oracle Hk2 which answers H(kk2P ) when queried with kP is
available. The query k1P is not allowed.
A.3. Encoding into elliptic curves
The problem of encoding a clear message as a point of an elliptic curve is not easy. There is
no deterministic polynomial algorithm for writing points on an arbitrary elliptic curve E mod
p. However, there are quick probabilistic methods for coding points, and these can be used
to encode messages. Among these methods we can mention: Trivial encoding, Encoding for
supersingular curves, The SWU algorithm, Icart’s function.
We recall some deterministic coding methods on elliptic curves. Let E an elliptic curve
over the finite field Fq.
• In 2013, Anna Krasnova and al. have proposed a deterministic encoding called Elligator
[18]. In their paper, they presented Elligator 1 and Elligator 2.
1. In Elligator 1 (the injective map): Here, certain requirements on q and E are fixed.
One considers only primes q such that q to be congruent to 3 modulo 4, E to be a
complete Edwards curve and an extra algebraic requirement. We are the following
theorems:
Theorem A.7. ( The map) Let q be a prime power congruent to 3 modulo 4. Let
s be a nonzero element of Fq with (s2 − 2)(s2 + 2) 6= 0. Define c = 2/s2. Then
c(c− 1)(c+ 1) 6= 0. Define r = c+ 1/c and d = (c+ 1)2/(c− 1)2. Then r 6= 0, and d
is not a square. The following elements of Fq are defined for each t ∈ Fq {±1}:
u = (1−t)/(1+t), v = u5+(r2−2)u3+u, Y = (χ(v)v)(q+1)/4χ(v)χ(u2+1/c2), X =
χ(v)u, x = (c− 1)sX(1 +X)/Y, y = (rR− (1 +X)2)/(rX + (1 +X)2).
Furthermore x2 +y2 = 1+dx2y2, uvXY x(y+1) 6= 0, and Y 2 = X5 +(r2−2)X3 +X.
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Definition A.8. In the situation of Theorem A.7, the decoding function for the com-
plete Edwards curve E : x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 is the function f : Fq −→ E(Fq) defined
as follows: φ(±1) = (0, 1); if t 6∈ {±1} then φ(t) = (x, y).
Theorem A.9. ( Invertin the map) In the situation of Definition A.8:
(a) If t ∈ Fq then the set of preimages of φ(t) under φ is {t,−t}.
(b) φ(Fq) is the set of (x, y) ∈ E(Fq) such that
– y + 1 6= 0;
– (1 + µr)2 − 1 is a square, where µ = y−12(y+1) ; and
– if µr = −2 then x = 2s(c− 1)χ(c)/r.
(c) If (x, y) ∈ φ(Fq) then the following elements X, z, u, t of Fq are defined and
φ(t) = (x, y) :
X = −(1+µr)+((1+µr)2−1)(q+1)/4, z = χ
(
(c− 1)sX(1 +X)x(X2 + 1/c2)
)
,
u = zX, t = (1− u)/(1 + u).
Theorem A.10. ( Encoding as strings) In the situation of Definition A.8, assume that
q is prime, and define b = blog2 qc. Define σ : {0, 1}b −→ Fq by σ(τ0, τ1, · · ·, τb−1) =∑
i τi2
i. Define S = σ−1({0, 1, 2, · · ·, (q − 1)/2}). Define ι : S −→ E(Fq) as follows:
ι(t) = φ(σ(τ)). Then #S = (q + 1)/2; ι is an injective map from S to E(Fq); and
ι(S) = φ(Fq).
2. In Elligator 2 (Handling Generic Curves with a point of order 2) We introduce a
new injective map ψ to any elliptic curve of the form y2 = x3 + Ax2 + Bx with
AB(A2 − 4B) 6= 0 over any odd finite field, i.e., any finite field of odd characteristic.
We emphasize that the characteristic is not required to be 3 modulo 4. This curve
shape includes all Montgomery curves y2 = x3 +Ax2 + x except y2 = x3 + x, and in
particular it includes Curve25519.
Theorem A.11. ( The map) Let q be an odd prime power. Let A,B be elements of
Fq such that AB(A2 − 4B) 6= 0. Let u be a non-square in Fq. Let √ be a square-root
function for Fq. Define R as the set{
r ∈ Fq : 1 + ur2 6= 0, A2ur2 6= B(1 + ur2)2
}
.
The following elements of Fq are defined for each nonzero r ∈ R:
v = −A/(1+ur2),  = χ(v3+Av2+Bv), x = v−(1−)A/2, y = −√x3 +Ax2 +Bx.
Furthermore vxy 6= 0 and y2 = x3 +Ax2 +Bx. If q ≡ 1( mod 4) and A2 − 4B is a
non-square in Fq then R = Fq.
Definition A.12. In the situation of Theorem A.11, the decoding function for the
Weierstrass curve E : y2 = x3 + Ax2 + Bx is the function ψ : R −→ E(Fq) defined
as follows: ψ(0) = (0, 0); if r 6= 0 then ψ(r) = (x, y).
Theorem A.13. ( Invertin the map) In the situation of Definition A.12:
(a) If r ∈ R then the set of preimages of ψ(r) under ψ is {r,−r}.
(b) ψ(R) is the set of (x, y) ∈ E(Fq) such that
– x 6= −A,
– if y = 0 then x = 0, and
– −ux(x+A) is a square in Fq.
(c) If (x, y) ∈ ψ(R) then the following element r of R is defined and ψ(r) = (x, y):
r =

√−x/((x+A)u) if y ∈√F2q;√−(x+A)/(ux) if y 6∈√F2q.
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Theorem A.14. ( Encoding as strings) In the situation of Definition A.12, assume
that q is prime, that q = 1( mod 4), and that A2 − 4B is not a square in Fq. Define
b = blog2 qc. Define σ : {0, 1}b −→ Fq by σ(ρ0, ρ1, · · ·, ρb−1) =
∑
i ρi2
i. Define
S = σ−1({0, 1, 2, · · ·, (q − 1)/2}). Define ι : S −→ E(Fq) as follows: ι(ρ) = ψ(σ(ρ)).
Then #S = (q + 1)/2; ι is an injective map from S to E(Fq); and ι(S) = ψ(Fq).
• In 2017, Nafissatou Diarra and al. proposed a new deterministic encodings based on
Elligator’s model, for some families of elliptic curves [8]. They investigate the prob-
lem of constructing Almost-Injective and Invertible Encodings (AIIE) for some forms
of curves, such as generalized Huff curves x(ay2 − 1) = y(bx2 − 1), classical Huff curves
αx(y2 − 1) = βy(x2 − 1), Edwards curves x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 and the Weierstrass model
y2 = x3 + ax2 + c. Let us recall some deterministic encoding theorems applied to the Huff
and Edward curves.
– An AIEE for the generalized Huff model x(ay2 − 1) = y(bx2 − 1):
Theorem A.15. Let q = 3 mod 4. Let c ∈ Fq such that c(c − 1)(c + 1) 6= 0. Let
A = −(c − 1c )2; then A 6= 0 and A is not a square. Let s = c+1c−1 ; then s 6= ±1. Let
λ ∈ F∗q ; define b = λ
2
1−s2 and a = −bs2. Then a+ b is a square, ab is not a square and
ab(a − b) 6= 0. Under the previous hypotheses, for each element z ∈ Fq {−1, 1}, the
following elements are well-defined: u = (1− z)/(1 + z); v = −u5 + (c2 + 1/c2)u3−u;
X = χ(v)u; Y = χ(v.(c2u2 − 1))√χ(v)v; a = λ2 = √a+b2 ; x = (1+X)(bX−α2(1+X)2)bαY
and y = (1+X)(aX−α
2(1+X)2)
aαY . Moreover, we have: Y
2 = −X5 + (2−A)X3 −X and
x(ay2 − 1) = y(bx2 − 1).
– An AIEE for the classical Huff model αx(y2 − 1) = βy(x2 − 1). In this section, one
proposes an encoding function for the classical Huff modelαx(y2 − 1) = βy(x2 − 1)
with αβ(α2−β2)(α2+β2) 6= 0, using Elligator-2 method. Let’s first give the following
algorithm.
Input: α, β ∈ Fq such that αβ(α2 − β2)(α2 + β2) 6= 0, u a non-square in Fq and r ∈ Fq
verifying α2 + uβ2r2 6= 0;
Output: A point (x, y) ∈ Eα,β : αx(y2 − 1) = βy(x2 − 1)
1: v = β(α
2+uβ2r2)
α(α2+β2) ;
2:  = χ(v(αv − β)(α− βv));
3: t = 12
(

(
1+v2
v − αβ − βα
)
+
(
α
β +
β
α +
v2−1
v
))
;
4: x = −
√
t(αt−β)
α−βt ;
5: y = xt ;
6: Return (x, y).
Theorem A.16. Let q be a prime power, α, β ∈ Fq such that αβ(α2−β2)(α2+β2) 6= 0,
u a non-square in Fq and define the set R = {r ∈ Fq : α2 + uβ2r2 6= 0}. Let Eα,β
be the elliptic curve defined over Fq by αx(y2 − 1) = βy(x2 − 1). Then algorithm 5
defines a deterministic encoding ψα,β : R −→ Eα,β, r 7−→ ψψα,β(r) = (x, y).
– An AIIE for the classical Edwards model x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2: In this section, one
proposes an algorithm which encodes directly an element of Fq to a point of an
Edwards curves Ed : x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2, where d is not a square, and without any
birational equivalence.
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Theorem A.17. Let q be an odd prime power, and d ∈ F∗q such that d 6= ±1,−2 and
d is not a square. Let u be a nonzero non-square and let R be a subset of Fq defined
by R = {r ∈ F∗q : ur2 + 1 6= 0, ur2(1− d)− (1 + 3d) 6= 0, ur2(1 + 3d)− (1− d) 6= 0}.
For any non-zero r ∈ R, the following elements are well-defined:
v =
(d− 1)ur2 − 3− d
ur2(d− 1) + 1 + 3d ; ;  = χ[(1− v
2)(1− dv2)];
x =
e(v + 1)(dv + 1) + dv2− 1
2d(v + 1) + (1− d) ; y = −
√
1− x2
1− dx2 .
Furthermore,  6= 0 and x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2.
A.4. Randomness extraction in elliptic curves
In this subsection, we define the randomness extractor in elliptic curves over Fqn (see [7]).
Definition A.18. (Collision probability): Let S be a finite set and X be an S−valued random
variable. The collision probability of X, denoted by Col(X), is the probability
Col(X) =
∑
s∈S
Pr[X = s]2.
If X and X ′ are identically distributed random variables on S, the collision probability of X is
interpreted as Col(X) = Pr[X = X ′].
Definition A.19. (Statistical distance): Let X and Y be S−valued random variables, where S is
a finite set. The statistical distance ∆(X,Y ) between X and Y is
∆(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
s∈S
|Pr[X = s]− Pr[Y = s]|.
Let US be a random variable uniformly distributed on S. Then a random variable X on S is
said to be δ-uniform if ∆(X,US) ≤ δ.
The extractor Lt, where t is a positive integer less than n, for a given point P on E(Fqn),
outputs the t first Fq-coordinates of the abscissa of the point P .
Definition A.20. Let H be a subgroup of E(Fqn) and t a positive integer less than n. The extractor
Lt is defined as a function
Lt : H −→ Ftq
P = (x, y) 7−→ (x1, x2, · · ·, xt)
where x ∈ Fqn is represented as x = x1λ1 + x2λ2 + · · +˙xnλn and xi ∈ Fqn .
Let us recall some theorems relating to the randomness extractors in elliptic curves. For
proof see [7].
Theorem A.21. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fqn and H a subgroup of E(Fqn). Then
∆(Lt(UH), UFtq ) =≤
2
√
qn+t
√
1 + log(q)
|H|
where UH is uniformly distributed in H and UFtq is the uniform distribution in E(Fqn).
Theorem A.22. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fqn , then
∆(Lt(UE), UFtq ) =
c√
qn−t
where UE is the uniform distribution in E(Fqn) and c is a constant depending on n.
Theorem A.23. If q = 2 and n = 11 then
∆(Lt(UE), UFt2) ≤
3√
2n−t
.
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A.5. Security Notions
A.5.1. One-Wayness. This is a weak kind of adversarial goal where the purpose of the adversary
is to reveal the whole plaintext m of a particular ciphertext c. However, this is an extremely weak
notion of security because revealing almost all of the plaintext is considered to be unsuccessful
according to this definition but actually in almost all systems revealing the plaintext partially is
considered successful. This goal is defined via a game between the adversary and the challenger
as follows:
Game 1 The One Wayness Game: PubKowA,Γ
1: G is run to obtain the keys (pk, sk)
2: m is chosen at random from message space
3: The challenge ciphertext c = Epk(m)
4: Adversary A is given pk and c to produce m′ = A(pk, c)
5: The output of the game is defined to be 1 if m′ = m and ⊥ otherwise.
A.5.2. Indistinguishability. This goal focuses on keeping the entire plaintext information secret
and it is the most popular adversarial goal. In this goal, the adversary selects two plaintexts of
his choice and sends them to an hypothetical challenger who has the secret key. The challenger
randomly selects one of the messages, encrypts it and sends the challenge ciphertext back to
the adversary. Here, the goal of the adversary is to find out which of the plaintext has been
selected by the challenger.
A.5.3. Malleability. The notion of malleability is introduced by Naor et al. [9]. The goal of
the adversary A who observes a ciphertext c of plaintext m, cannot modify it consciously and
obtain a valid ciphertext c′ of a plaintext m′ which is related to m where this relation is known
by the adversary.
A.5.4. IND-CCA Games. There are several possible capabilities of an attacker in the public
key setting depending on the availability of the decryption oracle which is a hypothetical black
box that is presented to the attacker so that it can make decryption queries of its own choice
and gets the corresponding plaintexts. This captures the possible real life attacks that consist
of attackers that has gained temporary access to the decryption oracle.
• CCA1 (Non-adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack, or lunchtime attack): Adversary A can
access the decryption oracle until it sees the ciphertext it needs to break.
• CCA2 (Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack): Adversary A always has access to the de-
cryption oracle but querying the ciphertext it needs to break is prohibited.
Remark A.24. Security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks is the most widely accepted
level of security notion.
We explain them in Game 2 and Game 3.
Game 2 IND-CCA1 Game: PubKind−cca1A,Γ
1: G is run to obtain keys (pk, sk).
2: Adversary A is given pk, as well as oracle access to Dsk and outputs a pair of messages
(m0,m1) of equal length.
3: A random bit b ∈ (0, 1) is chosen, and the challenge ciphertext c = Epk(mb) is computed
and given to A.
4: A continues to interact with Dsk before he gets the challenge ciphertext c and later it is
not allowed, then this kind of experiment is called CCA-1 or lunch time attacks.
5: The output is defined to be 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
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Game 3 IND-CCA2 Game: PubKind−cca2A,Γ
1: G is run to obtain keys (pk, sk).
2: Adversary A is given pk, as well as oracle access to Dsk and outputs a pair of messages
(m0,m1) of equal length.
3: A random bit b ∈ (0, 1) is chosen, and the challenge ciphertext c = Epk(mb) is computed
and given to A.
4: A continues to have access to Dsk even after he sees the challenge ciphertext, but may not
request a decryption of the challenge ciphertext itself and finally outputs a bit b′.
5: The output is defined to be 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
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